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CASE COMMENT
SEXUAL DISCRIMINATION:
PEER SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND
ITS EFFECT UNDER TITLE IX
DAVIS V MONROE COUNTY BOARD OFEDUCATION,
119 S. Ct. 1661 (1999)
JarretRaab* ""
Petitioner filed suit against Respondent, seeking compensatory and
punitive damages for the sexual harassment of her fifth grade daughter.'
Petitioner argued that Respondent failed to remedy a "prolonged pattern of
sexual harassment"2 by a fellow classmate. 3 The complaint alleged that
Respondent's deliberate indifference to persistent sexual advances created
a hostile learning environment that violated Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972' (Title IX).5 The district court dismissed Petitioner's
claim on the grounds that student-on-student harassment6 does not provide
a legitimate cause of action under the statute.' A panel of the Eleventh

*

This case comment received the Huber C. Hurst Award for the outstanding case

comment for Fall 1999.
** This comment is dedicated to my parents, Alvan and Beverly, for their unwaivering
guidance and support. I would also like to give special thanks to ES and RK for their
"encouragement" in completing this comment.
1. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 119 S. Ct. 1661, 1666 (1999).
2. See id. LaShonda claims that G.F "attempted to touch her breasts and genital area and
made vulgar statements such as 'I want to get in bed with you' and 'I want to feel your boobs."'
Id.at 1667. Furthermore, G.F. purportedly simulated having an erection and using it in a sexual
manner as well as making inappropriate physical contact with LaShonda in a school hallway. See
id. at 1667.
3. See id.
4. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681(1972)(amending 86 Stat. 373). "No person in the United States
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving federal financial
assistance." 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681(a).
5. See Davis, 119 S.Ct. at 1664.
6. The term "student-on-student harassment" is synonymous with the term "peer
harassment." See id. at 1666-67.
7. See id.
The trial judge dismissed the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See id. at 1668. The court
held that Title IX did not provide a basis for liability absent an allegation that the school board
or an employee of the school board had any role in the harassment. See id.

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OFLAW& PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. I I

Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court.' However,
upon granting Respondent's motion for an en banc rehearing, the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed the district court's original decision to dismiss the claim.'
The en banc panel held that Title IX provides the recipients of federal
funding with notice that they are prohibited from engaging in discriminatory
conduct, but the court failed to specifically forbid peer sexual harassment. 0
The United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded the decision of
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals" and HELD, a school board may be
liable under Title IX for peer harassment where the harassment is severe,
pervasive, and objectively offensive, where it effectively bars the victim
access to an educational opportunity or benefit, and where the school board
has shown 12both actual knowledge and deliberate indifference to the
harassment.

Historically, the United States Supreme Court has strongly discouraged
most forms of sexual discrimination. 3 The Court has used Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) to prohibit 14 employers from engaging
in all forms of discrimination in the workplace. 5 Similarly, the Court has
held that under Title IX, employers in the education system may be held
responsible for damages suffered by students who are subjected to sexual
discrimination. 16
In MeritorSavings Bank v. Vinson,7 the Supreme Court first examined
whether a claim of sexual harassment by an employee may constitute sexual
discrimination under Title VIIL Here, respondent was subjected to

8. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d. 1186, 1195 (11th Cir. 1996). A
majority of the panel found that peer harassment was a valid claim under Title IX, recognizing that
the petitioner sought to state a claim based on "the [school] officials' failure to take action to stop
the offensive acts of those over whom the officials exercised control." Id. at 1193.
9. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390 (1 th Cir. 1997).
10. See id. at 1414.
I I. See Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1676.
12. See id. The court stresses that its decision does not affect whether the petitioner will
ultimately prevail, but whether she is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims of peer
sexual harassment. See id.
13. See, e.g., Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986) (upholding a sex
discrimination on the basis of unwanted sexual advances).
14. Title VII states, in pertinent part, that it is an unlawful employment practice "to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1964).
15. See Rogers v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 454 F.2d 234, 241 (5th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
16. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
17. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
18. See id. at 59.
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repeated sexual advances and demands 9 by the bank manager shortly after
being hired by petitioner."0 After first refusing, respondent eventually
agreed to have sexual encounters with the manager "out of fear of losing
herjob."' Respondent worked under these conditions for over four years
before being fired after taking an extended sick leave.22 Respondent filed
suit against petitioner claiming that during her employment, she had been
subjected to sexual harassment in violation of Title VII. 23
Finding respondent's claim against petitioner to be valid, the Court
focused on the effects that the harassment had on both the employee and
on the employment environment.24 The Court declared that substantial
judicial decisions and EEOC precedent 5 firmly establish that unwelcome
sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical
conduct of a sexual nature can constitute sexual discrimination and is,
therefore, actionable under Title VII. 26 Such conduct has the purpose and
effect of creating an "intimidating, hostile, or offensive working
environment" which can unreasonably interfere with an employee's work
performance.27 The Court noted, however, that for sexual harassment to be
actionable,28 it must be so severe and widespread as to create an "abusive
' Furthermore, the Court stated that Congress
working environment."29
intended for the courts to rely on agency principles for guidance when

19. According to petitioner's trial testimony, respondent fondled the petitioner in front of
other employees, exposed himself to her, followed her into the women's bathroom whenever she
went there alone, and even forcibly raped her on several occasions. See id. at 60.
20. See id.
21. See id. Petitioner estimates that she and her supervisor had sexual relations over the next
several years both during and after office hours, estimating that they had intercourse some 40 or
50 times. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id. Petitioner argues that "when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate
because of the subordinates sex, that supervisor 'discriminate[s]' on the basis of sex." Id. at 64.
24. See id. at 65.
25. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) issued guidelines stating that
sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination strictly prohibited by Title VII because
employees are entitled to "work in an environment free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule,
and insult." Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Rules and Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg. 74,
676 (1980).
26. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65 (citing Rogers, 454 F.2d at 234).
27. Id. (quoting EEOC Guidelines 29 C.F.R. §1604.1 i(a)(3)(1985)).
28. The Court held that "the language of Title VII is not limited to 'economic' or 'tangible'
discrimination." Id. at 64. Sexual harassment leading to non-economic injury can violate Title VII.
See id. at 65.
29. Id. at 67. The Court pointed out that "criminal conduct of the most serious nature" is
sufficient to state a claim for"hostile environment" sexual harassment. Id. Mere utterances or
other comments that cause offensive feelings do not affect the conditions of employment
conditions to the degree necessary to bring a valid Title VII claim. See id. at 67 (citing Rogers,
454 F.2d at 234).
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applying Title VII. 3° These principles imply that employers may be liable for
the acts of their employees. 3 Therefore, the absence of notice regarding an
employee's
conduct does not necessarily insulate that employer from
32
liability.
Based, in part, on the holding of Meritor, the Court in Franklin v.
Gwinnett Count?3 evaluated a school board's potential liability relating to
a teacher-student sex discrimination claim under Title IX.34 The petitioner,
a female high school student, was subjected to continued sexual
harassment35 from a teacher employed by respondent.36 The complaint
alleged that respondent had been aware of the sexual harassment but took
no action to stop it." In fact, the school board was accused of taking
measures to conceal the incidents and discouraging petitioner from filing
charges.3"
In reviewing the petitioner's claims, the FranklinCourt considered two
general issues. First, the Court considered whether sexual harassment of
a student by a teacher constituted a valid cause of action under Title IX.39
Second, the Court considered which remedies, if any, were appropriate
under a Title IX suit.40 Following the holding from Meritor, the Court
determined that Title IX, like Title VII, 4 ' places a duty on employers not to
sexually discriminate against their employees.42
Additionally, the Franklin Court supported Meritor's holding that a
supervisor's sexual harassment of an employee constitutes sexual
discrimination.43 In Franklin,the Court found for petitioner.44 The Court

30. See id. at 72. Under Title VII, the definition of "employer" is defined to include "any
agent of [the employer]." 42 U.S.C.A. §2000e(b).
31. See Meritor,477 U.S. at 72.
32. See id.
33. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
34. See id.
35. See id. at 63. The teacher engaged in sexually explicit conversations with petitioner,
asked whether she (petitioner) would have sex with him, forcibly kissed petitioner on the mouth,
and subjected her to coercive intercourse during school hours. See id.
36. See id. Respondent was the Gwinnett County School Board. See id.
37. See id. at 64.
38. See id.
39. See id. at 66.
40. See id.
41. Title IX specifically applies to discrimination in "any education program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance." 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681. Title VII, on the other hand, applies
to discrimination in the workplace. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e 2(a)(1).
42. See Franklin, 503 U.S. at 75 (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64). "[W]hen a supervisor
sexually harasses a subordinate because of that subordinates sex, that supervisor discriminates on
the basis of sex." Id.
43. See id.
44. See id. at 76.
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held that an employer/employee relationship is analogous to a
teacher/student relationship.45 Supporting this conclusion, Justice White
stated that "surely Congress did not intend for federal monies to be
expended to support the same intentional actions it sought by statute to
proscribe."46
Addressing the second issue, the Franklin Court held that Title IX is
enforceable through an implied right of action.47 The underlying task,
therefore, was to determine what remedies were available pursuant to this
implied right.48 Because the petitioner's legal rights were invaded, and
because a federal statute provided for a general right to sue, the Franklin
Court held that any appropriate remedy was available to compensate the
victim for the damage that she suffered.4 9 Both equitable relief and
monetary damages were evaluated as possible remedies.5" It was held,
however, that no form of equitable relief would be appropriate under the
circumstances."' The Court ruled that a monetary award was the only
proper remedy. 2
While the Franklin decision established that monetary awards are
available under Title IX claims, the decision failed to specify the
circumstances necessary to apply such a remedy.53 The Supreme Court
clarified this issue in Gebserv. Lago Vista. 4 Petitioner was an eighth grade
student who was subjected to various forms of sexual harassment" by one
of her teachers.56 Respondent 7 was not aware of the sexual harassment 8
until a police officer caught the teacher and student having sexual
intercourse in a parked car.59 Petitioner filed suit for sexual harassment

45. See id. at 75.
46. Id.
47. See id. at 72 (citing Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979)).
48. See id. at 65-66. "[Tlhe question of what remedies are available under a statute that
provides a private right of action is 'analytically distinct' from the issue of whether such a right
exists in the first place." Id. (citing Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 (1979)).
49. See id. at 66 (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946)).
50. See id. at 75-76.
51. See id. at 76.
52. See id.
53. See id. at 60.
54. 118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998).
55. Petitioner endured several forms of harassment. See id. at 1993. She suffered sexual
comments directed towards her during classroom discussions, was kissed by the teacher during
a visit to her home, and eventually engaged in sexual relations with the teacher. See id.
56. See id.
57. Respondent was the Lago Vista Independent School District. See id.
at 1989.
58. Petitioner did not report the harassment to the respondent (school board). See id. at
1993. However, the respondent was notified by the parents of two other children to whom the
teacher had made improper comments in class. See id.
59. See id. The teacher was arrested and subsequently fired by the school board. See id.
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claiming a violation of Title IX.6"
At issue in Gebserwas whether an educational institution can be held
liable for violating Title IX based on the principles ofrespondeat superior6 '
and constructive notice.62 The petitioner argued that the Court should rely
on the Title VII criterion established in Meritor and applied to Title IX in
Franklin.6 a The Gebser Court, however, distinguished Title VII from Title
IX by pointing out that Title VII is an outright prohibition against sex
discrimination; whereas, Title IX's prohibition is of a contractual nature. 64
The Court interpreted this fact to mean that enforcement of Title IX
requires the respondent's actual notice of the discrimination in order to
allow voluntary compliance with the statute. 65 Additionally, in order for the
respondent to be held liable, its failure to comply with Title IX must result
from its "deliberate indifference" to the known discrimination.66 Here, the
Court found that respondent was neither aware of the sexual discrimination
nor acted with deliberate indifference
towards the discrimination, and could
67
IX.
Title
under
liable
held
not be
In the instant case, Petitioner filed a claim based on the school board's
failure to remedy known harassment.68 Petitioner alleged that the school
board's "deliberate indifference" to the persistent sexual advances made by
Respondent created an intimidating, hostile, offensive, and abusive school
environment. 69 The issue faced by the instant Court was whether peer
harassment provided the grounds for a claim of sexual discrimination under
Title IX. 70
Following the holdings of Gebserand Franklin,the instant Court found
that an implied right of action existed under Title IX, but only where

60. Petitioner initially sought compensatory and punitive damages against respondent raising
claims under Title IX, Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and state negligence law. See id. The
petitioner, however, only appealed the Title IX claim. See id. at 1994.
61. According to Black's Law Dictionary, respondeat superior, "let the master answer," is
a doctrine where an employer is held liable for injury resulting from the acts or omissions of its
employees. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1313 (7th ed. 1999). Constructive knowledge is defined
as a situation where a reasonable person knew or should have known of the existence of certain
facts. See id.
62. See Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 1994.
63. See id. at 1995.
64. See id. at 1996. Congress conditioned the award of federal funds under its spending
power on the school boards ability to comply with Title IX. See id. Note that the Monroe County
School Board is funded by the federal government. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 119
S. Ct. 1661, 1668 (1999).
65. See Gebser, 118 S.Ct. at 1998-99.
66. See id.
67. See id. at 2000.
68. See Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1667-68.
69. Id.
70. See id. at 1666.
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adequate notice7' of the discrimination was provided.' The instant Court
stressed that Respondent would only be held liable for its own misconduct
and not for the misconduct of its teachers." Because Respondent was not
directly involved in the harassment, it may not be held liable for monetary
damages unless its "deliberate indifference" towards the harassment
deprived the victim of access to the educational opportunities or benefits
provided by the school.74 A private right of action can, in fact, arise from
student-on-student sexual harassment.7" Respondent, however, may only be
held liable for its own failure to intervene in the ongoing harassment and
not for the actual conduct of the harassing student."
The various holdings from Meritorto the instant case suggest that the
United States Supreme Court has established a distinct legal trend. The
Court has consistently interpreted the congressional intent behind Title VII
and Title IX to prohibit authority figures in society from engaging in or
even tolerating sexual harassment." The law has evolved in a logical
manner and has been developed into a versatile tool to effectively combat
the various forms of sexual discrimination.7" The Franklin and Gebser
Courts borrowed Title VII law to establish liability under Title IX in
situations where teachers sexually harass their students.79 Similarly, the
instant Court used the Title VII approach to determine that student
harassment of other students may lead to a cause of action under Title IX. °
The intent behind and the application of the two statutes are analogous
to one another.8' Whereas Title VII includes a claim of damages for a
sexually hostile working environment created or tolerated by employers,82
Title IX encompasses damages due to a sexually hostile educational

71. The school board had actual notice that the peer harassment was taking place in an
environment under its control. See id. at 1672.
72. See id.
73. See id. at 1671 (quoting Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 1989).
74. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 168 1(a) (1972).
75. See Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1668-69. Note that this decision effectively resolves the conflict
among the federal circuits over this matter. See id.
76. See id. at 1670.
77. See, e.g., Meritor, 477 U.S. at 58 (holding that a claim of hostile environment sexual
harassment is a form of sex discrimination that is actionable under Title VII); Franklin,503 U.S.
at 64 (holding that a high school student who was subjected to sexual harassment and abuse could
seek monetary damages under Title 1X for intentional gender-based discrimination); Davis, 119
S. Ct. at 1666 (holding that private damages action may lie against a school board [under Title IX]
in cases of student-on-student harassment).
78. See Davis, 119 S. Ct. 1668-69 (holding that recipients may be held liable for their
deliberate indifference to acts of peer sexual harrassment).
79. See Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 2000.
80. See Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1668.
81. See id.
82. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (1964).

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNFAL OF LAW& PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. I1I

environent. 3 Such an environment is created when the supervising
authorities knowingly fail to act to eliminate peer sexual harassment."
In a strong dissent to the instant case, Justice Kennedy stated that under
Title IX, school boards cannot be held liable for peer sexual harassment.8 5
He stated that the implied right to damages86 did not exist in the instant case
because Title IX fails to give clear and unambiguous notice that the school
board is liable for failing to remedy discrimination by its students.8 7
Furthermore, he stated that it is inappropriate for a Title VII analysis to be
applied to Title IX claims. 8 The dissent pointed out that the primary
purpose of Title IX is to prevent recipients of federal funds from using
those funds in a discriminatory manner.8 9 It is not, however, intended to
curtail sexual discrimination by third parties.90 The discrimination violates
Title IX only if it is authorized by or in accordance with school board
policies.9 In other words, the discrimination must be "under the control of'
or "subject to the authority of' the school board.92
While the dissent made several valid points, it seemed to misinterpret
the majority's holding. It is true that Title IX does not apply to situations
where the school board is indirectly involved in student harassment.93 The
statute will apply, however, if the school board's deliberate indifference
subjects the student to such harassment.94 In the instant case, Respondent
was not held potentially liable for the actions of its students. Rather, the
Respondent's failure to address the known harassment of the petitioner was
the basis for Respondent's potential liability. 95 At minimum, the school
83. See Gebser, 118 S.Ct. at 1992; 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681 (1972), amending 86 Stat. 373.
84. See Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1667; see also Gebser, 118 S.Ct. at 1993 (holding that recipient
of federal funding intentionally violates Title IX when it is deliberately indifferent to known acts
of teacher discrimination); Franklin, 503 U.S. at 75 (holding that whether it is viewed as
"discrimination or subjecting students to discrimination," Title IX places the duty on the school
board not to permit such activities).
85. See Davis, 119 S.Ct. at 1679 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
86. See Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 1999.
87. See Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1678 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting). This implied right analysis is
also referred to as the "Gebser Notice Requirement." Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
88. See id. at 1679. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Title VII aims to compensate victims of
discrimination whereas Title IX merely seeks to protect individuals from discriminatory practices
carried out by recipients of federal funds. See id. (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
89. See id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
90. See id. at 1678 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
91. See id. at 1679 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
92. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). "Controlled by" is defined as: authorized by, pursuant to,
or in accordance with school policy or actions (subject to guidance and instruction of the school
board). Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
93. See id. (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
94. See id. at 1679-80 (citing 20 U.S.C.A. §1681(a)); see also Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 1999
(noting that the response must amount to deliberate indifference to'discrimination).
95. See Davis, 119 S.Ct. at 1674.
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board's deliberate indifference to the sexual harassment caused
Petitioner
96
harassment.
the
of
effects
the
to
vulnerable
more
to become
Furthermore, the majority opinion pointed out that both Gebser's
"notice" and "substantial control" requirements were satisfied.97 In Gebser,
the Court stated that an implied right to any appropriate remedy existed if
the claim is brought to vindicate a legitimate federal right.9" In the instant
case, both the regulatory scheme surrounding Title IX 99 and the existing
case law clearly indicated that a student has a right to be protected from
peer sexual harassment."° Additionally, at the time the harassment took
place, the school board and its administrators had been notified by various
sources that they faced potential liability from peer sexual harassment
claims.' ' The National School Board's Association Council and the U.S.
Department of Education's Office of Civil Rights each informed
Respondent that school districts "could be held liable for their failure to
respond to student-on-student" harassment. 0 2 Consequently, the school
board was given "clear and unambiguous notice" of its potential liability
under Title IX °3
The facts in the instant case also support the instant Court's conclusion
that Petitioner exercised substantial control over both the harasser and the
context in which the harassment took place.'" The harassment occurred on
school grounds, during school hours, while the students participated in
school activities that were controlled by school employees.' 0 5 Under these
96. See id. at 1672 (noting that the deliberate indifference argument makes sense as a theory
of direct liability under Title IX only where the school board has some control over the
harassment).
97. See id.
98. See Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 1996-97 (citing Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S.
677, 703 (1979)). "A private remedy should not be implied if it would frustrate the underlying
purpose of the legislative scheme." Id.
99. The regulatory scheme surrounding Title IX has firmly established that funding
recipients may be held liable for their failure to respond to the discriminatory acts of third parties.
SeeDavis, 119 S. Ct. at 1671 (citing 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.31(b)(6), .31(d), .37(a)(2), .38(a), .51(a)(3)
(1998)).
100. See id. at 1672. "The common law too has put schools on notice that they may be held
responsible under state law for their failure to protect students form the tortious acts of third
parties." Id. at 1671-72 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 320 (1965)). Similarly, state
courts "routinely uphold claims alleging that schools have been negligent in failing to protect their
students from the torts of their peers." Id. (citing Rupp v. Bryant, 417 So. 2d 658, 666-67 (Fla.
1982)).
101. See id. at 1673.
102. See id.
103. Id. at 1678 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
104. See id. at 1672.
105. See id. The court held that under these factual scenarios, the conduct is considered
"under the operation of the funding recipient." Id. (citing Doe v. University of II1., 138 F.3d 653,
661 (7th Cir. 1998)).
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circumstances, the Court was justified in holding that Title IX applied.
By correctly interpreting and applying the relevant statutory rules and
case law regarding Title IX and its relationship with student-on-student
sexual harassment, the Court has reconciled the practical realities of
responding to student behavior with the general principles contained in Title
IX. ° The instant Court developed a clear and logical rule after carefully
analyzing the application of Title VII and Title IX to various forms of
sexual harassment. This rule, in effect, gives school boards the flexibility to
address issues of student behavior in the manner they feel is best suited to
the circumstances, while ensuring that the board will take the necessary
steps to protect its students from peer sexual harassment. School boards are
not automatically liable for a student's harassment of other students, but
they do have a duty to act in a reasonable manner by taking the appropriate
steps in an attempt to remedy known acts of severe student-on-student
sexual harassment."°7

106. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681(a).
107. See Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1676. A school board will be held liable under Title IX where
the student's sexual harassment is severe, pervasive, and objectionably offensive and where such
harassment has a concrete negative affect on the victim's ability to receive an education. See id.

